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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last 100 years upstream of many cities reservoirs for water supply or hydro-
power have been erected. That must be included when considering the development of 
vulnerability and resilience of towns and cities downstream. 
In Germany Owners and Operators of installations and plants with a high hazard po-
tential are due to inform the authorities about possible accident consequences. This will 
help to detect hazards and to take measures if necessary. For operators of reservoirs and 
dams this means to inform the authorities or the public with the help of inundation maps 
not only about the consequences of natural floods but also about the flooding in the im-
probable case of a dam failure.  
According to the German Dam Standard DIN 19700 and other related regulations and 
guidelines different dam categories due to the height H above the foundation, the reser-
voir storage V, the importance and the hazard potential are given: Large Dams (ICOLD 
criterion): H ≥15 m or V ≥ 1 million m³ or big hazard potential or high importance;  
medium dams 6 m < H < 15 m, small dams H ≤ 6 m and V ≤ 100,000 m³, very small 
dams H ≤ 4 m and V ≤ 50,000 m³, smallest dams H ≤ 1 m (H here exceptional above 
terrain level) and V ≤ 10,000 m³. 
Although it has often been claimed that our dams are safe „in all probabilities“ we 
must recognize that some medium sized German dams e.g. at Kirchheim 1977, Gis-
sigheim 1984, Glashütte 2002 and Niedow 2010 (site in Poland but with subsequent 
flooding in Germany) and many small dams and levees failed during the last decades.  
From these records and the appropriate statistics can be derived, that residual risks do 
really exist and all necessary steps must be taken to detect them and to describe their 
possible impact and extent. 
Appropriate investigations have to be understood by the sensitive public as efforts to 
assess the dam safety and not as an evidence of insecurity of the dams. 
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ABSTRACT: Dam safety is a perpetual issue everywhere, when communities are locat-
ed downstream of dams. This paper reflects experiences of the related practice and con-
siderations in Germany. The probability of dam failure will be considered from a theo-
retical as well as from an empirical point of view. Information necessary in drawing up 
special hazard and risk maps are described and evaluated. For small dams further con-
siderations to simplify the analysis procedure will be presented. 
2 RISK OF DAM FAILURE 
Much is done to keep our dams safe: high level standards and guidelines, best practice, 
close mashed supervision and highly qualified dam operation personnel. 
The same we had also assumed to be valid for nuclear power plants that would affect 
much more people (even with long-term consequences) than dams in the case of failure. 
But the most recent incident in Fokushima, Japan, with loads beyond the design earth-
quake and Tsunami loads have shown us that the empirical failure probability of nuclear 
power stations is much higher than originally calculated and expected by the Associa-
tion for Nuclear Safety. The empirical failure probability for all nuclear power plants by 
Kauermann & Küchenhoff (2011) would be some 1:6600 per year [assuming the same 
failure probability for all plants, also if of different type; 2 accidents/30 years/440 exist-
ing nuclear power plants (during the whole 30 years)].  
 
Figure 1. F-N-Diagram for several risks including tolerable limits in different countries 
 
If the same simplified calculation is made with 4 failures of medium sized German 
dams during the last 65 years a failure probability of 1:10,000 per year (1*10-4) for a 
medium sized dam is yielded. Due to the lower number of fatalities related to the re-
ported dam break events the Risk = P · C for failing of a dam is far more than one mag-
nitude less (more secure) than of a nuclear power plant! In this first approach the num-
ber of the not centrally registered German medium dams was estimated to be about 3 
times the number of dams registered by ICOLD. For the about 300 registered large 
German dams (no failure during the last 40 years) the probability of about 1:14000 
(0.71*10-4) has been received which is more than one magnitude less (more unsecure) 
than the usually calculated results. For this calculation the upper limit of the confidence 
interval by using the ² -function was inserted.  
One of the first reports on people at risk of large installations was the Rasmussen-
Report (AEC 1975) with focus on nuclear power plants. Otway & Erdman (1970) pre-
sented limiting values for the acceptance of risks: a probability of 10-3 per year with one 
fatality requires immediate measures of risk reducing, 10-4 demands medium-term 
measures, 10-5 would initiate warnings and at 10-6 individuals do not feel concerned. 
Further tolerable limits are given in the well-known F-N-Diagram (Fig. 1). 
We can see that the results of the above dam risk approximation lie in or near the 
ALARP range of probabilities at about 10-4 and near the societal tolerable limit curve. 
This absolutely justify medium-term risk reducing and precautionary measures like 
drawing up and providing hazard maps. The possible consequences of a dam accident 
should be known to enable the responsible authorities and rescue forces to prepare ap-
propriate preventive measures like the installation of early warning systems or the elab-
oration of emergency management plans. This information is needed for emergency 
management plans, insurance purposes or the estimation of inundation danger of im-
portant structures like chemicals factories or nuclear power plants. 
3 INUNDATION MAPPING 
Dam break surges propagate more rapidly than natural floods downstream of the failed 
barrage as Figure 2 shows. They can reach 5 – 70 km/h and significantly exceed known 
flood level. A hazard estimation regarding dam break events needs information about 
the water depth, the flow velocity, the height of the surge as well as the concentration 
and quality of moving bedload and floating debris are important. 
For the practical computation as a part of dam breach inundation studies several one- 
and two-dimensional hydro-numerical programs are available. Reliable results are 
yielded from those programs that keep numerical stability also with high discharge and 
water level gradients.  
 
 
Figure 2. Left: Flood wave arrival time considering dam break events (c ≈ 10 km/h) and natural floods (c 
≈ 5 km /h), Right: Special hazard map with inundation area (and depth) due to a dam break wave 
 
When drawing up inundation maps for flooding due to hypothetical dam failure (Fig. 2) 
two types of maps are commonly used: a general map (scale 1:100000) with the entire 
flooded area and detailed maps of different cities or towns (scale of 1:10000). If the hy-
draulic-numerical calculation uses a one-dimensional model the maps include the fol-
lowing information regarding one dam failure scenario: 
General map (1:100,000) 
 Flooded area with water depth (marked with different colors) 
 Arrival time of the flood wave, arrival time of the flood peak, peak water level above 
sea level and peak discharge at certain points of interest. These are often cities and 
towns which are presented in detailed maps too. 
 Description of the assumed failure scenario. 
 Diagram containing the maximum depth and discharge along the talweg for the entire 
river reach considered 
Detailed maps (1:10,000) 
 Flooded area 
 Water depth in the flooded area (marked with different colors) 
 Location of the reference cross section (in most cases direct upstream of the first 
houses of a town) 
 Description of the assumed failure scenario. 
 Used data like digital terrain models (DTM) or software with their date of issue 
 Water depth and discharge versus time at the reference cross section 
 Arrival time of the flood wave, arrival time of the flood peak, peak water level above 
sea level and peak discharge at the reference cross section 
 Diagram containing the maximum water depth and discharge along the talweg for the 
entire river course depicted within the detailed map 
If the maps are based on two dimensional hydraulic-numerical calculation the water 
level or water depth are extracted at a reference point whereas the discharge is accumu-
lated along a reference cross section. Furthermore a direct plotting of the inundated area 
is possible and flow velocities can be displayed in colors or with vector arrows. 
 
 
Figure 3: Sketch for risk number 
 
In addition hazard zones can be displayed using intensity of different values (e. g. water 
depth x flow velocity or sediment layer thickness) and the occurrence probability. A 
flood event with high intensity that is expected frequently represents a high hazard and a 
high risk. Due to its very small occurrence probability a dam break often represents only 
a medium or small risk although it possesses a high intensity. This applies when risk is 
defined as a product of probability and consequences. Often the consequences are ex-
pressed by the monetary damage loss. But in addition also fatalities and destroyed parts 
of the cultural heritage as well as further aspects play an important role. To quantify and 
compare the hazard to the people e.g. the expression V·H·(I·EW/L) can be used with 
the symbols explained in Figure 3. 
The produced special hazard maps should be provided in well usable form: as con-
ventional hardcopy on paper (to make it available also in the case of blackout of elec-
tricity, communication and data networks) but also in electronically stored form (GIS, 
internet download with possibly only authorized access). 
4 SMALL DAMS 
A frequent issue is the estimation of the residual risk for dams. Whereas for large dams 
the propagation of a hypothetical surge due to dam failure is usually done in most small 
dam cases this would exceed the available budget. This is why it has been looked for 
more generalized approaches.  
In order to find a general approach for the estimation of the risk potential for small 
embankment dams there are ongoing investigations by means of a geotechnical-
numerical model (BASEMENT) at the VAW, ETH Zurich, Switzerland (VAW 2010, 
Volz et al. 2010). Simplified methods to estimate wave routing after to a dam break 
have been presented by Beffa (2001) and Bornschein (2009). 
 
 
Figure 4. Generalized intensity versus surge propagation path length (typical small and very small dams, 
H = 0.7 … 4.5 m, V = 10,000 … 100,000 m³). Left: maximum breach outflow by MacDonald & Lan-
gridge-Monopolis (1984), Right: Standard Breach by Beffa (2001), Flood routing method by Bornschein 
(2009) 
 
For Figure 4 simplified hydraulic calculations assuming a Standard breach (B = 2·H; 
m = 1) were carried out. It became visible that it is very difficult to find generalized so-
lutions due to the manifold input data describing the dam, the breach and the valley. 
When using the intensity = v · h as a criterion and define v · h < 0.5 as harmless, 0.5 < 
v · h < 2 as medium threat and beyond 2 as severe impact it could be derived that the 
expected impact and the danger for people are tolerable in the case of smallest dams 
everywhere, in the case of very small dams from 1 km and more downstream and for 
small dams from 10 km and more downstream. For other cases and more detailed in-
formation further calculations should be done. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The international legislation and guidelines concerning the handling of dam break haz-
ard maps and related emergency management plans differ considerably. In the frame of 
the residual risk assessment at dams the investigations should include the breach devel-
opment, the outflow hydrograph, the surge wave propagation and its consequences. The 
result of the investigation is normally a special hazard map that should be available at 
least at the dam owners, operators and competent (disaster control) authorities. It can be 
of advantage if also the affected people are informed.  
As many of the input data are uncertain quantities the hazard map displays a certain 
failure scenario. Different constraints and initial conditions can be taken into account by 
elaborating several maps. Another way for future dam break wave calculations could be 
the application of statistical methods that would produce water levels with a certain ex-
ceedance probability.  
The legal claim for providing information concerning the possible hazard release is 
construed by the dam owners and operators in a different way. Especially on the ques-
tion if the documents have to be ready or can be made only on demand different an-
swers are given. Also the question if the Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and 
management of flood risks includes these „artificial“ floods is discussed occasionally. 
It seems to the authors of this paper that among the owners and operators four per-
spectives can be detected: The first group has published the results of the dam breach 
inundation studies. The second group has this information available but prefers not to 
publish them to avoid misunderstandings. The third group plans to cope with the prob-
lem only after request by the authorities and the fourth group is not aware of any risk re-
lated to their installations. A first estimation for large dam operators in Germany might 
come to the percentages of 1%, 30%, 40% and 29% where the classification regarding 
group 3 and 4 is difficult and may vary. 
In the author’s opinion despite the very low dam failure probability provisional 
measures should be taken as it is usual also for natural floods. These are mostly lower 
but with a higher probability. Especially for dams upstream of urban areas these could 
include the drawing up of appropriate documents with hazard maps by the dam opera-
tors. 
Furthermore the disaster control authorities should consider these documents in their 
work and develop them towards emergency management plans. Also in this field some 
work is still to do. 
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